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Carlman: Wildlife-Private Property Damage Law - Once upon a Time in Wyomin

Casenotes
WILDLIFE-PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE LAW-Once upon a

time in Wyoming there was room for millions of cattle and
enough habitat for every species of game to find a luxurious
existence." In the aftermath of Parker,can we all still get along?
Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish
Commission, 845 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1993).

In 1830, Captain William Sublette introduced the first cattle to
the land which would later become the State of Wyoming.' From that

time to the present, livestock and the ranchers who own them have
been in a problematic relationship with native wildlife species. 2 While
substantial effort has gone into developing a cooperative relationship
between livestock and wildlife interests, 3 the historical balance has
been strongly in favor of livestock interests. 4
A new chapter in this more than 150 year old story began to
unfold in 1988, when a cow belonging to the Parker Land and Cattle

* Adapted from the preface to the first edition of laws for the Wyoming Territory. See infra
note 30.
1. T.A. LARSON, HISTORY OF WYOMING 163 (2d. ed. rev. 1978). Sublette brought "five

cattle, including one milch [sic] cow, to the Wind River Rendezvous in 1830." The first breeding
herd arrived in 1862. fd. at 163-64.
2. See PETER MATHIESSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 135-56 (rev. 1987). Mathiessen closes his
chapter Plains, Prairies, and the Shining Mountains with this quote from Francis Parkman's preface to
the 1872 edition of THE OREGON TRAIL: "A time would come when those plains would be a grazing
country, the buffalo give place to tame cattle, farmhouses he scattered along the water courses, and
wolves, bears, and Indians be numbered among the things that were." Id. at 156.
3. Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyo. Game and Fish Comm n, 845 P.2d 1040, 105758 (Wyo. 1993) [hereinafter Parker]. Current examples of cooperation include these Wyoming Game
and Fish Department programs: the "Ask First" campaign, designed to encourage hunters to behave
cooperatively with landowners, the "Landowner Newsletter," which has similar aims, and a special
landowner recognition program to reward excellence in conservation stewardship. The Wyoming
Stockgrower's Association, a group which represents approximately 1,500 Wyoming ranchers, is
collaborating with the Game and Fish Department to advance these programs. Interview with Bob
Budd, Executive Director, Wyoming Stockgrower's Association, in Cheyenne, Wyo. (Aug. 31,
1993).
4. Wildlife species in Wyoming which have suffered massive habitat loss or extinction at the
hands of white settlers of European descent include grizzly bears, mountain lions, wolves, elk, bighom sheep, bison, prairie dogs, and black-footed ferrets. Tim W. Clark & Robert D. Dom eds.,
Rare and Endangered Vascular Plants and Vertebrates of Wyoming (1981)(unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Northern Rockies Conservation Cooperative, Jackson, Wyo.). See Parker, 845 P.2d
at 1054.
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Company (Parker) of Dubois, Wyoming, tested positive for the disease
brucellosis. 5 When, on February 2, 1989, a second cow from the same
herd tested positive for brucellosis, the Parker herd was doomed to
destruction, 6 and a four year battle between livestock and wildlife
interests in Wyoming was underway.
Parker blamed the disease transmission on either elk or bison.7
Parker asserted that "[d]uring the summer of 1988, at least nine head
of buffalo were seen on the Warm Springs allotment during July." 8 In
addition, the 4,800 animal Wiggins Fork Elk Herd, located near
Dubois, used the Warm Springs allotment for seasonal habitat, and a
small number of elk from the Jackson Elk Herd, located west of the

5. Brucellosis is "[a]n infectious reproductive disease from bacteria of the genus brucella. It is
transmitted orally by ingestion of the bacteria from contaminated placentas or other birth products of
female animals. Its major manifestations are abortions or retained placentas in females and orchitis in
males." Parker,845 P.2d at 1041. Brucellosis was not found in native Wyoming wildlife until a Yellowstone National Park bison tested positive in 1917. I.R. Mohler, Abortion disease, ANN. REP. OF
THE BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, WASH., D.C., 40 (1917). The

next occurrence of brucellosis in wildlife came when three National Elk Refuge elk tested positive in
1930. E.A. Tunnicliff and H. Marsh, Bang's disease in bison and elk in the Yellowstone National
Park and on the National Bison Range, 86 J.AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 745-752 (1935). See
also OLAUS J. MURIE, THE ELK OF NORTH AMERICA 175-76 (1951) (Murie was the field biologist
who made the discovery in 1930). Scientists maintain that brucellosis originated in domestic livestock,
and was transmitted to wildlife. Interview with Dr. E. Tom Thorne, Director of Veterinary Research,
Wyoming Game and Fish Department, in Laramie, Wyo. (Sept. 9, 1993).
6. "All cattle in Wyoming lawfully found to be affected with either tuberculosis or Bang's
disease [brucellosis] may be shipped or transported under the direction of the state veterinarian in
accordance with federal regulations, to livestock markets and there sold for salvage and destroyed in
accordance with federal regulations." WYO. STAT. § 11-19-214 (1989). After veterinary testing revealed that the Parker herd was heavily infested with brucellosis, the herd was quarantined and subsequently depopulated. These steps were taken in response to orders from the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) and the Wyoming State Veterinarian. Brief of Appellant at 2,Parker, (No.
91-147) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant], The brucellosis-free status of Wyoming has significant economic value to Wyoming ranchers. Telephone interview with Dr. Russell Burgess, Area Veterinarian
in Charge, United States Department of Agriculture, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (Sept.
20, 1993).
7. A routine USDA investigation made during the course of responding to the brucellosis
outbreak supported this conclusion. The USDA found that the most probable source of the infection
was either elk or buffalo, and that the infection was not caused by cattle. Brief of Appellant, supra
note 6. at 2. Both elk and bison are capable of carrying brucellosis. E. Tom Thore et al., Bovine
Brucellosis in Elk: Conflicts in the Greater Yellowstone Area, ELK VULNERABILITY SYMPOSIUM 297
(1991). The incidence of the disease varies greatly from herd to herd, and the potential for its transmission is similarly highly variable. Id. at 299.
8. Parker Land and Cattle Company Damage Claim, No. FY90-119, Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Claim at 3 (Wyo. Game and Fish Comm'n, May 9, 1991). The
Parker Land and Cattle Company was the grazing lessee on the approximately 19,200 acre Warm
Springs Grazing Allotment. The allotment was administered by the Shoshone National Forest in western Fremont County, Wyoming. Interview with Brent Larson, U.S. Forest Service Wind River District Ranger, Shoshone National Forest, in Dubois, Wyo. (Aug. 5, 1993).
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Continental Divide, may have periodically dispersed into the Warm
Springs allotment. 9

Under the State of Wyoming's wildlife damage statute,' 0 Parker
sought recovery of $1,136,106 in damages" from the Wyoming Game
and Fish Commission. The statute allows a party" who suffers loss to
property due to actions of big game or trophy game animals 3 to file a
claim for recovery 4 with the Wyoming Game and Fish Department. 5
Parker filed such a claim with the Department on February 22, 1990.6
The Department disputed the claim, and so its immediate governing
body, the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, arranged for a hearing. 17
Following three days of proceedings, the Commission denied
Parker's claim on May 9, 1991."8 The Commission cited two grounds

9. Interview with Tom Toman, Wyoming Game and Fish Department District One Game
Supervisor, in Jackson, Wyo. (July 25, 1993).
10. WYO. STAT. § 23-1-901 (1991) [hereinafter wildlife damage law or wildlife damage statute].
11. Parker calculated its damages as follows: feed, transportation, and other expenses caused
by quarantine, $149,560; loss of market value of cattle sold because of quarantine, $ 181,008; future
loss of income because of capital loss of breeding herd, $805,538. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1041.
12. The claimant may be "[a]ny landowner, lessee or agent." WYO. STAT. § 23-1-901(a)
(1991).
13. Big game animals are defined as "antelope, bighorn sheep, deer, elk, moose, or mountain
goat . . , ." WYo. STAT. § 23-1-101(a)(i) (1991). Trophy game animals are defined as "black bear,
grizzly bear or mountain lion . . . ." WYO. STAT. § 23-1-101(a)(xii) (1991). Bison are classified as
neither big nor trophy game animals. Instead, bison are generic "wildlife." along with "all wild mammals, birds, fish, amphibians, reptiles, crustaceans and mollusks, and wild bison ... " WYO. STAT.
§ 23-1-101(a)(xiii) (1991).
14. WYO. STAT. § 23-1-901(b) (1991).
15. [Hereinafter Department or Game and Fish Department.] The Game and Fish Commission
[hereinafter Commission], consists of seven gubernatorially appointed members who serve for six
year terms, and the governor, as an ex-officio member. WYO. STAT. § 23-1-302 (1991). The Commission sets broad policy, approves the budget, and generally oversees the work of the 346 permanent
employees of the Department. WYO. STAT. § 23-1-201 (1991).
16. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 9.
17. If the Department is to deny the claim, it must do so within ninety days after submission;
any aggrieved party may dispute a denial by appealing to the Commission within thirty days of the
denial. The Commission then must review the action at its next regular meeting. WYO. STAT. § 23-1901(c)(d) (1991). Due to the magnitude of the Parker claim, and to guide its consideration, the Commission appointed retired Wyoming Supreme Court Justice John F. Raper as Hearing Officer. Justice
Raper obtained proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law from both Parker and the Department. He adopted the Department's proposed findings and conclusions of law in making his recommendation to the Commission that Parker's claim be denied. Claim No. FY90-l 19, Order Overruling
the Objections of Parker Land and Cattle Company to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order Proposed by Hearing Officer, (Wyo. Game & Fish Comm'n, Jan. 22, 1991).
18. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Denying Claim at 27 (Wyo. Game and
Fish Comm'n, May 9, 1991). The Commission received testimony from seven expert witnesses and
determined there was insufficient evidence of a wildlife to cattle transmission. It also described the
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for its decision: the Parker claim was not cognizable,

9

and even if the

claim was cognizable, Parker had failed to link the receipt of brucellosis by its herd to transmission by wildlife.'
In July of 1991, Parker appealed the decision of the Commission
to the Wyoming Supreme Court. 2' In a parallel and ultimately unsuccessful suit, Parker also sued the United States Government.22
The Wyoming Supreme Court handed down its plurality opinion

on January 22, 1993.23 Killing Parker's hopes for recovery, the court
held there was insufficient evidence upon which to conclude that state
owned wildlife caused the brucellosis infection in the Parker herd.24
However, through an aggregation of opinions, three of the five justices

Parker brucellosis vaccination program as being below the local area standard. Parker had 25.89% of
its cattle tagged as official calfhood vaccinates; the local standard was 51.8%. Id. at 15-16.
19. The Commission employed a strict method of statutory interpretation. The presence in
WYO. STAT. § 23-1-901(c) (1991) of a list of compensable sources of harm, the absence from that list
of brucellosis transmission from wildlife to cattle, and a common law prohibition against non-legislative waiver of sovereign immunity all led the Commission to find the Parker claim beyond the scope
of the statute. Id. at 19-21.
20. See supra note 18.
21. The Wyoming District Court of Laramie County certified the matter directly to the Wyoming Supreme Court, per Wyo. R. APp. P. 12.09. Reflecting an ideological theme of the controversy, the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a conservative, pro-mining/logging/livestock advocacy
group, together with the Wyoming Stockgrower's Association, a trade group, jointly filed an amicus
brief with the Wyoming Supreme Court.
22. Parker named three defendants within the Department of Interior: the National Elk Refuge,
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), Grand Teton National Park, and Yellowstone National Park (National Park Service). Parker based its claim on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671
(1988). For a review of the federal case, Parker Land and Cattle Co., Inc. v. United States, 796 F.
Supp. 477 (D. Wyo. 1992), [hereinafter Parker II], see Robert B. Keiter and Peter H. Froelicher,
Bison, Brucellosis, and Law in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1,
38-45 (1993). In that case, Federal District Chief Judge Clarence Brimmer found that "[t]he FWS
[Fish and Wildlife Service] and NPS [National Park Service] have acted negligently in managing the
wildlife, in that they each have failed to take an active role in eliminating the brucellosis problem in
the elk and bison which are under their control." ParkerII, 796 F. Supp. at 486. Nonetheless, Judge
Brimmer held that Parker failed to establish that any wildlife species under the control of the defendant federal agencies had caused harm to Parker. Consequently, Parker recovered nothing from the
federal government. Id. at 488.
23. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1040.
24. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1068. The court's ruling may have also been the death-blow to the
Parker Ranch. As of 1993, five years after the first brucellosis-infected cow was identified, and four
years after the herd was destroyed, Parker was running cattle on neither the 14,500 acres of deeded
ranch land, nor the U.S. Forest Service Warm Springs allotment. While a livestock permittee lacks a
legal property right in a grazing allotment, there is a practical and substantial monetary benefit associated with the sale of private ranch property which is tied to a federal grazing permit. If the pattern of
non-use continues, by July 1, 1994, Parker will be on the verge of forfeiting its interest in the Warm
Springs and Horse Creek grazing allotments, and the value of the Parker property as a cattle ranch
may be significantly reduced. Interview with Brent Larson, supra note 8. See also U.S. FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2231.7 (1991) and FOREST SERVICE
HANDBOOK §§ 2209.13.16 et seq. and 2209.13.17 et seq. (1992).
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held that brucellosis transmission from elk or bison to cattle is a compensable form of damage under the wildlife damage statute.'
This casenote briefly reviews the history of Wyoming damage
compensation law as it relates to wildlife and private property, and
sketches the changing socio-economic environment at play in the background of Parker.26 It then discusses the methods and canons of statutory interpretation used by the two factions of the Wyoming Supreme
Court. 7 The casenote finishes with an argument in favor of legislative
action to expressly exclude harm to livestock from big game animals
as a compensable form of claim in Wyoming.
BACKGROUND28

The laws of white people and the laws of wild nature first met in Wyoming in the year 1869,9 when members of the First Territorial Legislature
gathered in Cheyenne. 30 In 1890, the livestock industry made known its
political strength with the inclusion of an article in the newly adopted Wyoming State Constitution which specifically directed the legislature to protect
livestock interests. 3' The first statutory expression of the imbalance of power

25. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1079-83.
26. The Parkerdecision itself goes on a powerful and informative fifteen page literary tear into
the legal history of livestock and wildlife in Wyoming. It describes the evolving cultural tension
between wildlife and agricultural values, and sets this opinion apart from the narrowly focused genre
which dominates case opinion writing in the United States. See, e.g., Parker, 845 P.2d at 1052-66.
27. No attempt is made to describe, much less exhaust, the massive volume of scholarly information on statutory interpretation. Rather, the casenote seeks to expose perennial themes, as articulated by the Wyoming Supreme Court and leading scholars in American jurisprudence, and place those
themes in the context of Parker.
28. For this part of the casenote, I have drawn heavily upon the work of Justice Golden. See
supra note 26. The best source of contextual background is Justice Golden's presentation in Parker
itself. A minimum amount of background is furnished here to provide the reader with necessary
context.
29. "As the Civil War ended, white invasion into this magnificent natural game preserve intensified." Parker, 845 P.2d at 1053.
30. In the preface to the first edition of laws for the Wyoming Territory, Territorial Secretary
Edward M. Lee gushed at the bounty of the land, stating that:
Wyoming can successfully compete with all the world in the matter of stock growing, and
upon her plains there is room and sustenance for millions of cattle and unnumbered herds
of wool-bearing animals ... Every species of territorial game finds a home and a luxurious existence upon these comparatively unknown though grandly fertile vales.
Preface to Wyo. Laws at v-vi (1869).
31. WYo. CONST. art. 19, § 1. The provision remains a part of the State Constitution today,
and reads:
The legislature shall pass all necessary laws to provide for the protection of livestock
against the introduction or spread of pleuro-pneumonia, glanders, splenetic or Texas fever,
and other infectious or contagious diseases. The legislature shall also establish a system of

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1994

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 29 [1994], Iss. 1, Art. 3
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXIX

between livestock and wildlife interests came in 1915, when the legislature
authorized game wardens to kill elk found to be damaging personal
property. 32
Wildlife Damage Statutes and Related Adjudications

The Wyoming legislature began authorizing appropriations for game
animal depredations in 1925, 33 and adopted the first damage compensation

law in 1929. 3' This damage compensation statute was significantly modified three times between 1929 and 1980. 35
The 1980 modification redefined the scope of the State's liability.
When the 1980 budget session of the Wyoming legislature convened, a
property owner could seek compensation from the State only for "damaged land, growing cultivated crops, stored crops, seed crops, improvements, and extraordinary damage to grass."36 An amendment initiated in
the State Senate to add livestock damaged or killed by a trophy game
animal37 to the list of compensable losses succeeded. 38

quarantine, or inspection, and such other regulationsas may be necessary for the protecof stock owners, and most conducive to the stock interests within the state.
tion
(Emphasis added.)
32. Act of Feb. 25, 1915, ch. 91, 1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws 87-88 (repealed by Act of Feb. 18,
1921, ch. 83 § 104) (permitting the State Game Warden and his employees to kill any elk doing
damage to personal property).
33. Act of Feb. 25, 1925, ch. 90, 1925 Wyo. Sess. Laws 94-95 (appropriation to twenty-four
private parties totalling $4,825). Depredations typically resulted from elk or moose returning to native
winter ranges, only to find them occupied by homesteaders and void of forage but for the hay in the
homesteaders' haystacks. See OLAUS 1. MURIE, THE ELK OF NORTH AMERICA 313-14 (1951), and
for an anecdotal version, see BERTHA CHAMBERS GILLETTE, HOMESTEADING WITH THE ELK 9 (2d

ed. 1968).
34. Act of Feb. 19, 1929, ch. 85. § 1, 1929 Wyo. Sess. Laws 107 (repealed by Act of Feb.
17, 1939, ch. 65 § 95). In Parker, Justice Golden informs the reader of one opinion of the statute
from that time period:
In 1952, Dr. Ira N. Gabrielson, of the Wildlife Management Institute, Washington, D.C.,
submitted a report tothe Commission after several months analyzing the Game and Fish
Department's operations ... In Dr. Gabrielson's opinion, in his previous studies of the
game laws of many other states, only in Wyoming had he found laws which gave 'so much
special consideration to livestock operators at the expense of the fish and game
resources' . ..."
Parker, 845 P.2d at 1064 (emphasis added).
35. (1) Act of Feb. 17, 1971, ch. 60 § 1, 1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws 60-62; (2) Act of Mar. 9,
1973, ch. 249 § 1, 1973 Wyo. Sess. Laws 576-78; (3) Act of Mar. 6, 1980, ch. 37 § 1, 1980 Wyo.
Sess. Laws 43-44.
36. Act of Mar. 9, 1973, ch. 249, § 1 1873 Wyo. Sess. Laws 576-78; WYO. STAT.
23.1.32(a)(b) (1973).
37. S.File 019, 45th Leg., 2d Sess. at 32-34 (1980). For the definition of a trophy game animal see supra note 13.
38. S.File 019, 45th Leg., 2d Sess. at 32-34 (1980).
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A proposed amendment in the State House of Representatives to establish state liability for damage inflicted on livestock, without the delimiting
words "by a trophy game animal," failed.39 The form in which the 1980
legislature had left the statute remained unchanged when Parker sought compensation in 1989. At that time, the Game and Fish Department was to consider claims "based upon a description of the livestock damaged or killed by a
trophy game animal."I The words "big game animal" did not appear in the
relevant section.4
Prior to Parker, the Wyoming Supreme Court had four occasions to
interpret the wildlife damage laws. The first opportunity arose in 1939 when
"some twenty head of deer got into the garden and practically ruined the
lettuce crop." 42 The damaged party received a favorable judgment in the
district court, which the Game and Fish Commission challenged on appeal.
The Commission's allegation of contributory negligence was defeated by the
to guard against "a danger not reasonably
court's ruling that no duty existed
43
to have been apprehended.
The Wyoming Supreme Court next encountered the wildlife damage
laws in 1960, after "a cloud of ducks" descended on Harvey Latham's farm
and allegedly ate a substantial amount of barley. 44 In holding for Latham, the
court rejected the Game and Fish Commission's arguments that the district
court had abused its discretion or relied upon insufficient evidence.4" The
supreme court did not interpret, or even cite, the applicable wildlife damage
statute.
The Wyoming Supreme Court's third opportunity to apply the animal
damage laws came in 1962, after Albert 'Ab' Cross shot two "quarrelsome
moose" on his ranch a few miles west of Dubois, Wyoming.' The issue was
whether a property owner could protect his property against depredations by
game animals. Reversing the district court and ruling in Cross' favor, the
Wyoming Supreme Court relied on a property owner's natural right to protect

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
cloud of
see ....
45,
46.

Id.
WYO. STAT. § 23-1-901(c) (1991) (emphasis added.)

Id.
Van Horn v. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 92 P.2d 560, 561 (Wyo. 1939)
Id.at 562.
"The evidence showed . . . 'Nobody ever see [sic] that many ducks in the sky before,' 'a
ducks,' 'the sky was black over his field several nights,' 'just as thick as you could
Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n v. Latham, 347 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1960).
Id.at 1009.
'Ab' Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371. 374 (Wyo. 1962).
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private property. a7 As in Latham, the court did not address the matter of
statutory interpretation.
Prior to Parker, the last Wyoming Supreme Court adjudication of the
wildlife damage statutes came in 1989."8 In that case, the claimants lost a
number of domestic sheep to mountain lion depredation. The Game and Fish
Commission disputed the impartiality of an arbitration board which had ruled
in favor of the claimants, asserted that the damage award granted by the
arbitration board was too large, and complained to the Wyoming Supreme

Court that no record had been made of the arbitration hearing to which the
Commission had been a party.' The court denied all of the Commission's
allegations5" and again chose not to construe the wildlife damage statute.
Methods of Statutory Interpretation

While the wildlife damage cases prior to Parker did not motivate the
Wyoming Supreme Court to engage in statutory interpretation, dozens of
other cases have.5 Two distinct methods of statutory interpretation52 appear in
Wyoming jurisprudence generally and in Parker specifically: the plain meaning approach 3 and the equitable discretion approach. 4
47. In Cross, the parties stipulated to the fact that 'Ab' Cross shot two moose, and to the fact
that he had, with the knowledge and consent of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, made
numerous attempts to resolve the moose-related problems. Id. at 372-74. While the court affirmed
Cross' right to self-help, it did so in the context of Cross having reasonably exhausted his practical
and administrative remedies. Id. at 375-78.
48. Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n v. Smith, 773 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1989).
49. Id. at 943. The role of an arbitration board is described at WYO. STAT. § 23-1-901(d)
(1991).
50. Smith, 773 P.2d at 944.
51. The opinion of the court in Parkercited forty cases which directly address statutory interpretation, of which fourteen clearly describe the "plain meaning" approach. Parker, 845 P.2d 1040.
Justice Urbigkit, in his dissent, cited nine cases and directed the reader to his concurring opinion in
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 223-34 (Wyo. 1991),
where he cited forty-two cases, including twenty-eight from Wyoming, in support of a general context
approach to statutory interpretation. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1080.
52. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for a description of the two approaches. See
generally, John Choon Yoo, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation,
YALE L.J. 1607, 1608-12 (1992) (arguing that these two potentially conflicting approaches to statutory interpretation are inherent in the design of the judicial branch of government in the United States,
and are a consequence of at least three historic forces: (1) familiarity-expressed as both contempt
and comfort-with English courts of equity; (2) disarray and incongruity among colonial statutes,
which endeared early Americans to the equitable power of courts; and (3) fear of the potential tyranny
of an unelected legal authority). For a famous exchange of scholarship on the merits and demerits of
strict adherence to text versus open reference to such non-textual sources as legislative history, see
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930), and James M. Landis, A Note
on "Statutory Interpretation", 43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 416-25 (1989) (challenging as a false oversimplification the dichotomy between plain meaning and "extratextual" analysis).
53. Adherents to this approach are often labelled textualists, literalists, or originalists. See, e.g.
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Wyoming Supreme Court Justice Potter succinctly stated the plain meaning approach early in the court's history, writing, "If the language employed
is plain and unambiguous, there is no room left for construction ... Courts

are not at liberty to depart from that meaning which is plainly declared." 5
Conversely, the equitable discretion approach involved the integration of the
litigated statute with the surrounding statutory, legislative, and historical
environment.5 6 These two doctrines of statutory interpretation attached to two
larger constitutional themes: the balance of power between the judicial and
legislative branches, 7 and the consequent accountability of law givers to law
receivers."8

Sunstein, supra note 52, at 416.
54. Commentators use terms such as intentionalism, extratextualism, and dynamic statutory
interpretism to describe this approach to statutory interpretation. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinkoff,
UpdatingStatutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 22 (1988). As it is used in this casenote, the
phrase "equitable discretion" most precisely conveys the idea that an assortment of interpretive techniques other than plain meaning analysis are available to jurists, and the use of these extra-textual
tools may have the effect of moving the judge into the sphere of equity. See, e.g., Yon, supra note
52, at 1608-09.
55. Rasmussen v. Baker, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897). See also Druley v. Houdesheldt, 294 P.2d
and proving its use in Wyo351, 352 (Wyo. 1956) (providing an equally clear statement of the rule,
ming through the middle of the twentieth century). At the federal level, a classic statement of the
plain meaning rle is found in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917). For an analysis
of the plain meaning rile as applied in Camineni, see Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die:
The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretationin the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1299, 1300 (1975) (acknowledging that an inevitable variety of circumstances calls for the
selective use of plain meaning analysis, legislative intent, and "good sense" in determining the meaning of a statute). Id. at 1316-17.
56. Justice Urbigkit eloquently described the equitable discretion approach when he wrote:
[a]ny individual statute is a single strand within the woven law. (Citations omitted.) The
use to which it is actually put is dependent upon the surrounding statutes and the societal
environment within which it is used. Like all things where change is inevitable, the environment into which the statutory provision in its specific language is applied will, from
time to time, change. The responsibility of the judiciary is to assure reasonable workability
of the entire law and faithfully distribute the legislators' intended burden upon that strand.
specially concurring). For an oft-quoted version from the
Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d at 229 (Urbigkit, J.,
federal courts, see also Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (Learned Hand, J.).
57. "Strict adherence to our Wyoming Constitution demands that the judicial branch of government recognize that it is without discretion, nor does it have any latitude, to apply statutes contrary to
legislative intent once that intent has been ascertained. Legislative intent must be ascertained initially
and primarily from the words used in the statute." Allied Signal, 813 P.2d at 219 (Wyo. 1991). See
also Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in
the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 277, 281 (1990) (articulating the federal judiciary's duty, "within constitutional limits", to defer to the intent of Congress).
58. "Debates over statutory meaning are often disputes over interpretive principles; these
debates reflect broader divisions over the nature and performance of the regulatory state and, indeed,
about the character of American democracy and constitutionalism as a whole." Sunstein. supra note
52, at 413. Compare Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretationand Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO.
L. J. 281 (1989) (exploring the practical application of the legislative supremacy principle) with William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L. J. 319 (1989) (calling legislative
supremacy a "shibboleth," encouraging careful congressional awareness of statutory interpretation,
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Changing Socio-economic Environment
The Parker controversy occurred in the context of substantial and rapid
cultural transition. 9 Just as the seemingly discrete jurisprudential debate between alternate methods of construing statutes is tied to large and powerful
themes, so too, is the specific controversy of Parker linked to broad-scale cultural and economic trends. Where ranching was once the unquestioned king of
the high Wyoming plains, in northwest Wyoming and around the West,"o
ranching had become increasingly characterized as a quaint relic, 61 a marginal
economic activity,' and a source of environmental harm.63
While the specific agent of change in Parker appears to have been a
microscopic bacteria, large economic, demographic, and political forces
continue to bring about inevitable changes in the American West.' These
changes are typically described in terms of a transition from an extractive,
intensive use of land to one which emphasizes recreational land use and a
resettlement of the West by people employed in the trade of information and

and promoting tests of fairness and justice in evaluating judicial interpretation of statutes).
59. See Keiter and Froelicher, supra note 22, at 9-12 (describing shifts in public land management policy and changes in the social and economic environment which tend to support wildlife
and recreational values, and stating that "traditional extractive industries are in decline . . ").
60. The Parker Ranch, located near Dubois, Wyoming, was tied to federal land management
policies through its two federal grazing allotments on the Shoshone National Forest. Interview with
Brent Larson, see supra note 8. The ranch and its grazing allotments were also within the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, an area of large wilderness tracts and growing tourist economies. See, Rick
Reese, GREATER YELLOWSTONE 45, 89 (1984).
61. See e.g., Special Issue: An Alternative to the Bumper Sticker Approach to Grazing, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 23, 1992, at 23, and Deborah Frazier, Ranch 'Culture' Fading Away, CASPER
STAR-TRIB. Nov. 9, 1993 at Cl, in which the author writes, "Mhe ranching life isn't as good as it
used to be. When neighbors sell to development, subdivisions bring dogs that chase cattle, traffic,
neighbors who complain about cattle smells, lawsuits over 100-year-old water rights and accusations
of land rape and animal abuse."
62. See Michael Riley, Beef Ranchers Say Better Times Don't Mean Security, CASPER STARTRIB., Apr. 26, 1993, at Al, and Michael Riley, Analysts Say [Grazing] Fee Hikes Hit Individuals,
Not Economies. CASPER STAR-TRIB., Apr. 29, 1993, at Al (stating that while total on-farm production, including ranching, in the U.S. totals only about 2% of the Gross Domestic Product, individual
ranchers in Wyoming are vulnerable to disruptions in the livestock economy). A companion to the
livestock industry in Wyoming, wool production, may be pushed beyond the margin of economic
viability by the congressional repeal of the 1954 Wool Act which authorized direct subsidies to wool
producers. David Hackett, Congress Votes to Kill Wool Program. Wool Growers. Most Will Be
Forced Out of Business, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Oct. 16, 1993, at Al.
63.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, GAOIRCED-88-80, RANGE-

LAND MANAGEMENT: MORE EMPHASIS NEEDED ON DECLINING AND OVERSTOCKED GRAZING ALLOT-

MENTS (1988) (documenting range condition in the western U.S. and calling for restoration of damaged lands).
64.

See CHARLES F.

WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND,

WATER, AND

THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 75-113, 293-306 (1992); THE EAGLE BIRD: MAPPING A NEW WEST
(1992); WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, BEYOND THE MYTHIC WEST (1990).
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expertise. 65 As large scale cultural change proceeds, the legal relationship
between wildlife and livestock interests in Wyoming is likely to experience its
own set of related changes.
PRINCIPAL CASE

Parker and the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission presented the
same three issues to the Wyoming Supreme Court: (1) whether there was
substantial evidence to indicate nearby elk or bison transmitted brucellosis
to Parker's cattle herd, (2) whether the wildlife damage statute included
an invitation for disease-related claims of harm to livestock, and (3)
whether the Commission's findings and its ruling were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law and
should therefore be reversed.' Parker prevailed only on the second is67
sue.
Interpretationof the Wildlife Damage Statute
The most contentious issue of Parker was whether the wildlife damage statute allowed the State to consider a claim alleging harm by big
game to cattle. In its review of that issue, the court split into two factions." Justices Thomas, Cardine, and Urbigkit considered the Parker
claim to be cognizable under the wildlife damage statute.69 Justices Golden and Macy reached the opposite conclusion.7"The route by which the
court brought itself, the parties, and the public to this understanding of
the wildlife damage statute passed through the field of statutory interpretation.

65. See Boom Time in the Rockies: More jobs and fewer hassles have Americans heading for
the hills, TIME, Sept. 6, 1993, at 20. See also Raymond Rasker, Rural Development, Conservation,
and Public Policy in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, 6 SOC'Y AND NAT. RESOURCES 109 (1993);
Thomas Michael Power, Ecosystem Preservationand the Economy in the Greater Yellowstone Area,
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, Sept. 1993, at 395 (describing and quantifying a cultural and economic
transition from extractive, commodity-based activity to non-consumptive, service oriented activity
which draws directly on the aesthetic and wilderness values of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem).
66. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 1. and Brief of Appellee at 1, Parker (No. 91-147)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellee].
67. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1079-83. See infra notes 83-103 and accompanying text.
68. Justice Golden wrote the opinion of the five member court, but was joined only by Chief
Justice Macy. Justice Thomas concurred, and Justice Cardine specially concurred in the holding that
Parker had failed to establish that either elk or bison had transmitted the disease to the Parker herd.
Conversely, Justices Thomas, Cardine and Urbigkit dissented on the ground that claims for damages
arising from disease transmission from wildlife to cattle were cognizable under WYO. STAT. § 23-1901.
69. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1079 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at
1079-80 (Cardine, J., specially concurring); Id. at 1080 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
70. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1066.
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The opinion of Justice Golden, in which Justice Macy joined, cited a
tradition of plain meaning analysis in Wyoming jurisprudence which
reached from the first years of statehood to the present. 7' Justices Golden
and Macy aligned themselves with that tradition.7" The Commission had
sought application of plain meaning analysis." According to the Commission, subsection (c) of the damage claim statute did not authorize the Department to consider claims of harm to property caused by diseases,
because diseases were not among the enumerated types of damage
agents.'
Parker had also invoked plain meaning analysis in its argument for
damage compensation. Parker argued that subsections (a) and (b) of the
wildlife damage statute authorized payment for brucellosis transmission
from either elk or bison to cattle.75 Parker acknowledged that subsection
(a) was devoted to damage reporting requirements, and that subsection (b)
was limited to the method by which a claim was to be filed. Parker then
asserted that these two sections "plainly authorize[d]" payment for harm
to property inflicted by either big or trophy game animals. 76
In their plain meaning analysis, Justices Golden and Macy noted the
presence of two clearly defined terms, "big game animals" and "trophy
game animals", in the wildlife damage law.' The absence of the word
"bison" from the list of species defined as either "big game animals" or
"trophy game animals" controlled their conclusion that claims arising
from harmful interaction between livestock and bison could not be compensated.7 8 The absence of the term "big game animals" from the subsection of the statute authorizing the Game and Fish Department to consider claims arising from harm to livestock provided Justices Golden and
Macy with their basis for finding that the plain meaning of the wildlife
damage law excluded claims arising from harm to livestock by elk.79
Justices Golden and Macy supplemented their plain meaning analysis
with inferences drawn from a comprehensive review of legislative history.' Having drawn on both plain meaning analysis and legislative histo-

71.

Id. at 1042-43.

72.

Id.

73. Brief of Appellee, supra note 66, at 22.
74. Id, at 23.
75.

Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 18-19.

76. Id. at 18.
77. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1046-47.
78. Id. at 1047.
79. Id. at 1048-49.

80. Justices Golden and Macy set the stage for their analysis of the most current legislative
history by summarizing the entire history of human occupation of Wyoming. Their summary began
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ry, 8" Justices Golden and Macy found that the wildlife damage statute did
not permit the State to consider claims alleging harm to livestock from
big game animals. 2
Justices Thomas, Cardine, and Urbigkit found that application of the
plain meaning rule would either unduly immunize the State from a reasonable form of claim or unconscionably impose on Parker the full cost of
its loss.' Thus, Justices Thomas, Cardine, and Urbigkit found the plain
meaning approach to be inappropriate.' Their use of the ambiguity" and
absurdity' canons of statutory interpretation led them to this decision.
Justice Cardine found the wildlife damage statute to be ambiguous.'

with the arrival of the first humans approximately 11,000 years ago. It included an account of white
migration and settlement alongside and often in place of native wildlife from the mid-19th century to
the early 20th century, and culminated with a review of each significant statutory expression of the
changing relationship between the modem human occupants of Wyoming and native wildlife. They
placed particular emphasis on the revisions made to the wildlife damage law during the 1980 session
of the Wyoming legislature. Id. at 1052-66.
81. See generally Wald, supra note 57, at 279-302 (endorsing the use of both plain meaning
analysis and extrinsic material).
82. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1066.
83. Id. at 1079-83.
84. Justice Cardine wrote, "Icannot buy into a construction of our game and fish legislation
that results in the Game and Fish ducking responsibility for damage it caused and the rancher going
bankrupt." Id. at 1079. Justice Urbigkit characterized the statutory interpretation of Justice Golden as
one which "cramps the plain meaning of the English language .. .[is a]cramped and illogical construction .. .[and is flawed by a] legalistic fallacy." Id. at 1082. Justice Urbigkit relied on statements by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534
(1940), which appear to "repudiate" the plain meaning rule. Allied Signal, 813 P.2d at 228. For an
interpretation of American Trucking which is at odds with Justice Urbigkit's interpretation, see Murphy, supra note 55, at 1301. For an acknowledgement of a resurgence of the plain meaning rule in
the U.S. Supreme Court, see Wald, supra note 57, at 280-81.
85. "If a statute is ambiguous ... we will resort to general principles of statutory construction
in the effort to ascertain legislative intent. (Citation omitted.) A statute which is uncertain and susceptible of more than one meaning is ambiguous." Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 (Wyo. 1988),
citing McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1985)). Long ago a legal scholar remarked on the ubiquitous and potentially pernicious presence of ambiguity in the law, writing, "in the use of language
uncertainty and ambiguity are sure to occur ... The imperfection of language is a serious evil when
it occurs in those legislative commands on which the repose, discipline, and well being of society
depend." THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION
AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 190 (2d ed. 1884). See also Felix
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 YALE L.J. 527, 528 (1947) (finding the

dilemma of statutory construction rooted in the fact that words are merely "inexact symbols" of
ideas).
in a manner producing absurd results." Story,
86. "[A] statute should not be construed
755 P.2d at 231. The canon of statutory interpretation which addresses the problem of absurdity is
described at 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 45.12 (5th ed. 1992).
87. Justice Cardine wrote that, "the statute is ambiguous concerning any intent to limit a claim
based on the types of damages or the type of game animal." Parker, 845 P.2d at 1079 (Cardine, J.,
specially concurring). The derivation of meaning from both the specific, operative words of a statute
and the surrounding text was endorsed long ago by Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote that "[wihere
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He used as his basis for finding ambiguity in the wildlife damage statute
"the inconsistent placement of terms such as 'trophy game animals' and
'big game animals' within the subsections of [the wildlife damage statute]."" He concluded that the Game and Fish Department was liable for
all damage to property caused by any species of wildlife which is
"claimed, owned, protected by or licensed for hunting and taking by the
Game and Fish." 9
Justice Urbigkit characterized the risk of harm to livestock from brucellosis as "a Typhoid Annie danger."' That the presence of brucellosis might
be "an acceptable risk" to livestock operators, he found "hard to believe.""'
This was tantamount to a finding of absurdity. 92 Thus, Justice Urbigkit construed the wildlife damage statute as creating a cause of action for livestock
owners who claim to have suffered harm to their livestock due to wildlife
sponsored disease transmission.93
Having used the ambiguity and absurdity canons of statutory interpretation to reject plain meaning analysis, Justices Cardine and Urbigkit applied a
total of six additional methods of statutory interpretation to find the Parker
claim cognizable.' 4 Justice Cardine's two additional methods of statutory
interpretation were looking to the general context of the statute,95 and examining legislative intent.96 Parker had also urged the Wyoming Supreme Court
to look beyond the literal meaning of the words to the overall purpose of the
statute. 9
the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be
derived . . . ." United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).

88. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1079. Subsections (a) and (b) of WYo. STAT. § 23-1-901 (1991) refer
to "big or trophy game animals," but subsection (c) refers only to damage from a "trophy game
animal."
89. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1079 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1080.
91. Id. at 1080-81.
92. Justices Golden and Macy acknowledged the absurd result canon, and were aware of the
consequences of their decision not to employ it. However, they did not find that application of the
plain meaning rule would lead to an absurd result. Id. at 1050.
93. Id. at 1079-83.
94. The six methods involved examination of: (1) general context, (2) legislative intent, (3)
general policy, (4) history, (5) constitutional provisions, and (6) analogous situations. Id. at 1079-83.
It is the sum of these six methods of statutory interpretation to which this casenote applies the phrase
"equitable discretion." See supra note 54.
95. Justice Cardine referred to the "in pan materia" canon of statutory interpretation. This
canon encourages its user to examine how a specific statute, or part of a statute, fits into the larger
surrounding statutory context. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1079.
96. Justice Cardine said that legislative intent "ought to be determined by conditions as they
exist today in our society." Id.
97. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 20-21. Parker made five additional arguments: (1)
harm to livestock is "no different than injuring or killing an animal by combative actions which have
been compensated," (2) because the Wyoming Game and Fish Department controls elk and bison
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As a preface to his analysis, Justice Urbigkit invited the reader to review
a variety of established principles of statutory construction.9" He used four
additional and distinct tools of statutory interpretation: policy,99 historical
analysis," 0 constitutional demand,'' and analogy.' 02 Justice Urbigkit's use of
these four tools led him to include harm to livestock by elk or bison within
the scope of the wildlife damage statute.'03

hunting, and is legally responsible for wildlife management in Wyoming, it should be financially
responsible for damages elk or bison cause to livestock, (3) loss in property value caused by actions
of "state-managed wildlife" is compensable under the takings provisions of both the state and federal
constitutions, (4) nothing in the damage claim law expressly precludes compensation when the source
of harm is disease, and (5) the Game and Fish Department knew of the danger of brucellosis transmission and breached its duty to adequately warn Parker of the threat. Id. at 21-23.
98. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1080, inviting the reader to see Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo.
1991)(Urbigkit, I., specially concurring). In that case, Justice Urbigkit conducted his own exhaustive
and scholarly analysis on the subject of statutory construction. He stated his low opinion of the "plain
English" method when he wrote, "I believe literalists or originalists are essentially result-oriented
adjudicators . . . ." Id. at 231. Justice Urbigkit closed his special concurrence in Allied-Signal with
an extensive quote from Robert Weisberg, The CalabresianJudicial Artist: Statutes and the New
Legal Process, 35 SrAN. L. REV. 213, 213-215 (1983). the last two sentences of which read as follows:
Even judges who recognize the theoretical possibility of plain meaning concede that it must
yield where it produces an absurd result. The uncertain boundaries of absurdity counsel
against ever finding language 'plain.' and the impossibility of a formal definition of absurdity casts doubt on even the logical possibility of any formal plain meaning.
Allied Signal, 813 P.2d at 214 n. 8.
99. Justice Urbigkit argued that, "The Game and Fish Commission should be financially responsible for the results of their management of wildlife which, by negligence or inattention, spreads
contagious livestock diseases." (Emphasis added.) Parker, 845 P.2d at 1080.
100. Justice Urbigkit provides his historical analysis in one brief paragraph, in which he discounts Justice Golden's "exhaustive research" as unnecessary. Id.
101. Id. at 1081-83. Justice Urbigkit drew upon Wyo. CONSr. art. 1, § 33, which reads,
"[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation." Interestingly, appellant dedicated only one sentence to this argument in its brief. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 23. Amici Wyoming Stockgrower's Association and Mountain States Legal
Foundation did not make this argument at all.
102. Justice Urbigkit wrote:
Within a result-defined comparison, there is little difference between the predatory characteristics of some kinds of wildlife who kill the animals of a rancher for food or otherwise
or the bacilli, bacteria or virs which are nurtured by the wildlife and spread into the cattle
herds with an equally damaging conclusion.
Id. at 1081.
103. Id. at 1083.
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Both the litigants and Justices Golden and Macy engaged the doctrine of

sovereign immunity in Parker.'0 5 The Commission had argued that the wildlife damage law gave only a limited waiver of immunity, and asserted that
"[slovereign immunity is the rule and waiver is the exception."' 6 Conversely,
Parker had asserted that the State of Wyoming had waived governmental
immunity by enacting the wildlife damage law. 7 Justices Golden and Macy
searched the wildlife damage law for an "unequivocal and textual" invitation
from the State to potential claimants whose livestock may have been harmed
by big game, and found none.0"
Justices Cardine, Thomas, and Urbigkit did not directly acknowledge

the doctrine of sovereign immunity."° Indeed, Justice Urbigkit turned the
doctrine on its head. He suggested that there should be a presumption in favor
of state liability when a livestock operator links the presence of disease in his
herd to transmission from wildlife, and he denied the existence of any countervailing policy." 0

104. For a comprehensive overview in two pans, see David Minge, Governmental Immunity
From Damage Actions in Wyoming, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 229, 617 (1972). For a more recent
review which includes an argument for complete legislative abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, see Algirdas Mykolas Liepas, Comment, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in Wyoming:
Current Status of the Doctrine and Arguments for Abrogation, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 220
(1985).
105. The sovereign immunity canon of statutory interpretation states that any law which permits
claims against the state is to be construed according to its most limited potential meaning. Parker,845
P.2d at 1044-45 (citing Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n, 177 P.2d 397, 399 (1947); accord
Retail Clerks Local 187 v. Univ. of Wyoming, 531 P.2d 884, 886 (Wyo. 1975)). A related canon
states that where ambiguity is present in a statute which voids sovereign immunity, the most plausible
resolution in favor of the state is to be selected. See Liepas, supra note 104, at 226. These canons are
fortified by the democratic notion that:
[Sovereignty] consists of the power and right existing in the people and the persons to
whom this power has been delegated. The people are regarded as the beneficiaries of the
immunity that accrues to their agencies of government ... Therefore, the rule exempting
the sovereign from the operation of the general provisions of a statute is premised on a
policy of preserving for the public the efficient, unimpaired function of government.
3 Singer, supra note 86, at § 62.01.
106. Brief of Appellee, supra note 66, at 29.
107. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 17.
108. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1044, 1066.
109. In his specially concurring opinion, Justice Cardine began with a conclusory approach to
resolving the question of whether the State was immune from liability, writing, "I proceed from the
premise that the Game and Fish Commission is liable for all damages (whether from disease, killing,
clawing, injury or otherwise) to the livestock and property of citizens caused by [wildlife]." Parker,
845 P.2d at 1079. His subsequent use of four specific tools of statutory interpretation to reach the
same conclusion is discussed supra at notes 87-102 and accompanying text.
110. Id. at 1080.
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CausalLink Between Wildlife and Harm to ParkerHerd
In addition to its detailed review of whether the Parker claim was cognizable, the Wyoming Supreme Court also considered the practical question
of causation. Specifically, the court examined whether substantial evidence
supported the Commission's holding that Parker had failed to establish a
causal connection between the presence of brucellosis in its herd and the
"'
alleged presence of brucellosis in nearby elk or bison.11
The Commission had urged the court to rely upon the weight of evidence developed during its own administrative proceedings." 2 Parker, however, had asserted that the testimony of experts whose opinions were favorable to Parker was sufficient to establish a causal link between the presence of
brucellosis in elk and bison and its presence in the Parker herd." 3
Four of the justices affirmed the Commission's finding that Parker failed
to establish a causal connection." 4 In reaching this conclusion, Justices Golden, Macy, Thomas, and Cardine all applied the agency deference statute." 5
This statute restricts an appellate court's power to reverse conclusions of an
agency hearing record which are supported by substantial evidence." 6
The threshold question before the Wyoming Supreme Court, when it
reviewed the factual findings of the Game and Fish Commission, was whether
the Commission's findings were supported by "substantial evidence."" 7 In
their analysis, Justices Golden and Macy first defined the term "substantial
evidence."" They then cast the hearing record as a battle of experts and
found the three experts who sided with the Commission to be sufficiently well
qualified and persuasive to render the Commission's order adequately supported by the evidence." 9
This statutorily encouraged deference to legally adequate agency proceedings might have ended the appellate court's review.' 20 However, Justices

111.

See infra note 118.

112. Brief of Appellee, supra note 66, at 11-16.
113. Brief of Appellant, supra note 6, at 15-16.
114. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1067-68, 1079-80.
115. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (1992) [hereinafter the agency deference statute]. Parker,
845 P.2d at 1066-68, 1079-80.

116. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (1992).
117. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1066.
118. Id., defining substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
119. Id. at 1067.
120. Justice Cardine did indeed draw the line here. He wrote:

[wlere I deciding this case in the first instance, I might be inclined toward appellant. However, on appeal the question presented is one of substantial evidence to support the findings
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Golden and Macy went on to assess the evidence for themselves. They found
the probability of disease transmission from elk to one or more of the Parker
herd animals to be remote, 2' and, in three quick paragraphs, similarly discounted the likelihood of a bison transmission.'" 2 Thus Justices Golden and
Macy determined that, even if the claim was cognizable, Parker had failed to
meet its burden of proof.'23
Only Justice Urbigkit found that the Commission's action denying the
Parker claim was unsupported by substantial evidence. t24 Justice Urbigkit
determined that "[iun reality, the agency was just protecting itself from damage payment obligation."" 2 Based on his review of the agency hearing record,
Justice Urbigkit found a legally sufficient causal link between the potential
transmission of brucellosis from either elk or bison and the receipt of brucellosis by the Parker herd.'26 Justice Urbigkit was the only one of the five
justices who would have awarded damages to Parker. 27
ANALYSIS

The Parker case called upon the Wyoming Supreme Court to resolve
two concerns: what methods should the court use to interpret the wildlife
damage statute, 2 and who should bear the loss when the forces of wildlife

of the hearing officer and the decision of the commission . . I can agree that the Game
and Fish Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's claim and will,
with some reservation, concur.
Id. at 1080. Justice Thomas also agreed with the court on the matter of substantial evidence, stating
that "substantial evidence supports the ruling that Parker Land & Cattle Co. failed to establish the
source of the brucellosis." Id. at 1079.
121. Id. at 1067. Tom Toman, the District One Game Supervisor responsible for management
of the Jackson Elk Herd, and Bruce Smith, Biologist for the National Elk Refuge, were each expert
wimesses in the respective state and federal cases. They were adamant that the probability of a transmission from a Jackson Elk Herd animal to one of the Parker cows-as Parker alleged had occurred-was made remote by the combination of rugged, snow-bound terrain, the availability of secure and much more convenient calving grounds west of the Continental Divide, and the secretive
calving behavior of elk. Interview with Toman, Jackson, Wyo. (July 23, 1993). Interview with Smith,
Jackson, Wyo. (Aug. 2, 1993). The Wyoming Stockgrower's Association's Bob Budd was equally
adamant about the low probability of cattle to cattle transmission. His confidence is rooted in the
cattle industry's increasingly successful record in eradicating brucellosis. Interview with Bob Budd,
Executive Director, Wyoming Stockgrower's Association, in Cheyenne, Wyo. (Aug. 31, 1993).
122. Parker, 845 P.2d. at 1068.
123. Id. at 1067-68.
124. Id. at 1083.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. The discretion enjoyed by the Wyoming Supreme Court to choose among methods of statutory interpretation is considered a plenary power of the judicial branch, and is at the heart of the
judicial function. See Yoo, supra note 49, at 1630. Suspicions persist throughout the legal communi-
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and agriculture collide. While the court rendered a decision in which Parker is
a clear loser, it is difficult to find a clear winner. After the ink has dried in
the case reporters, the attorney fees have been paid, and the volumes of legal
documents have been stored away, the Wyoming citizenry, the ultimate losing
party, is left with increased liability created by the fractured precedent of a
divided court." 9
The singular precedential highlight of the decision in Parker was the
Wyoming Supreme Court's adherence to the guidelines of the agency deference statute. 3 0 In its application of this statute, the court determined that there
was substantial evidence to support the agency's factual findings.' 3' In so doing, the court deferred to the expertise of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission and to the due process afforded all parties in the fact-intensive phase
of the dispute. This offers hope that the Wyoming Supreme Court will in the
future again give serious consideration to the factual findings of the Commission.
Statutory Interpretationand Sovereign Immunity
Parker's only success came in the finding by Justices Thomas, Cardine,
and Urbigkit that harm to livestock from big game animals is a compensable

form of damage claim.' 32 Parker achieved this despite three significant statuty, from law students through Wyoming Supreme Court justices, that the choice of method is reached
only after a justice decides on a choice among a variety of possible outcomes. This so-called "outcome-determinative" jurisprudence is in virtually universal disrepute, yet the possibility that it remains in steady use is acknowledged by the unremitting protestations to the contrary. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d at 231 (Urbigkit, J., specially concurring).
129. The Wyoming Game and Fish Department, in an effort which offers some hope to both the
livestock industry and wildlife interests, is moving ahead with its own response to the long-term
problem of brucellosis in elk and bison. In cooperation with other wildlife and agriculture agencies
from Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho, the Department has in mind two forward-looking goals: (1)
protect and enhance the free-ranging elk and bison herds of the Greater Yellowstone Area; and (2)
protect and enhance the interests and economic viability of the livestock industry in the same three
states. To achieve these goals, the responsible agencies propose to eradicate brcellosis from wildlife
in the Greater Yellowstone Area by the year 2010. Lauren McKeever, Task force goal: Rid park of
brucellosis. Wyoming, Idaho, Montana set2010 as target date, CASPER STAR-TRiB. Aug. 27, 1993,

at B1.Achievement of these goals, however admirable, is made daunting by the fact of widely dispersed and highly elusive individual wild animals, whose numbers are considered substantial. Interview with Bruce Smith, Biologist for the National Elk Refuge, Jackson, Wyo. (Aug. 2, 1993).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
131. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1067-68, 1079-80. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
132. This success may have been short-lived. The Parker court no longer exists, as the Wyoming electorate removed Justice Walter Urbigkit from office in November, 1992. He was replaced by
Justice William Taylor. Interestingly, Justice Taylor joined Justices Golden, Macy, and Thomas for
the majority in the first case to use Parker as precedent, Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n v. J.R.
Thomock, 851 P.2d 1300 (Wyo. 1993). In that case Justice Thomas wrote the court's opinion. He
cited with approval the Parkerholding that WYO. STAT. § 23-1-901 "is not ambiguous." Thornock,
851 P.2d at1304. But it was only by finding the statute was ambiguous in Parker that Justice Thom-
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tory considerations: (1) the seemingly preclusive clarity of the definitions of
big and trophy game animals, 133 (2) the legislature's functional placement of
those definitions at the beginning of the title and chapter of the Wyoming
code in which the wildlife damage laws are found, and (3) the absence of the
words "big game" in the portion of the statute which authorizes the Department to consider claims seeking compensation for harm to livestock.'34
The expansive reading of the wildlife damage law by Justices Thomas,
Cardine, and Urbigkit also came at the expense of the plain meaning rule of
statutory interpretation and the public interest principles which underlie the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. A final casualty of their jurisprudence is the
constitutionally significant notion of separate judicial and legislative functions.,'35
At the time Parker filed its claim, the Game and Fish Department could
only consider harm to livestock caused by trophy game animals.' 36 The wildlife damage statute did not permit the Game and Fish Department to award
damages if the harm was wrought by elk, because elk were not defined as
trophy game animals.'

Bison were neither defined as trophy nor big game

3'

animals; therefore, the Department could not consider claims for any damage caused by bison. Nonetheless, Parker pursued its claim based on a theory
of brucellosis transmission from either elk or bison.

as, in his concurrence with Justice Cardine and Urbigkit, was able to find the state potentially liable
for damages caused by elk or bison. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1079. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
133. Neither elk nor bison were defined as "trophy game animals", and the wildlife damage law
directed the Game and Fish Department only to "consider the claims based upon a description of the
livestock damaged or killed by a trophy game animal." WYO. STAT. 23-1-901(c) (1991). See supra
note 13. For the maxim that "technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate meaning
in law shall be understood according to their technical import," see In Re Dragoni, 79 P.2d 465, 467
(Wyo. 1938).
134. WYO. STAT. § 23-1-901(c) (1991). A canon of statutory interpretation which apparently
failed to impress Justices Thomas, Cardine, and Urbigkit states:
Where the legislature has specifically used a word or term in certain places within a statute
and excluded it in another place, the court should not read that term into the section from
which it was excluded . . . The omission of words from a statute must be considered intentional on the part of the legislature ... Words may not be supplied in a statute where the
statute is intelligible without the addition of the alleged omission . . . This court will not
supply omissions in a statute and redress is with the legislature.
In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976).
135. A common view of the judicial function in statutory interpretation places the courts in the
role of agents, and the legislature in the role of principal. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a notable
proponent of this view, wrote, "if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my
job." Sunstein, supra note 52, at 415 (citing 1 HOLMES-LASKi LETrERS 249 (M. Howe ed. 1953)).
136. WYO. STAT. § 23-1-901(c) (1991).
137. Id. See supra note 13.
138. See supra note 13.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol29/iss1/3

20

Carlman: Wildlife-Private Property Damage Law - Once upon a Time in Wyomin
CASENOTES

Justices Golden and Macy read the wildlife damage statute and found it
unambiguous. 139 To them, the term "trophy game animal" limited claims of
harm to livestock to those alleging "tooth and claw" damage by grizzly bears,
black bears, or mountain lions."I I The other three justices read the same statute and found that it was ambiguous. 4'
Justices Golden and Macy considered the consequences of their reading
on both Parker and the general public; they deemed the anticipated results of
their jurisprudence not to be absurd. 42 The other three justices, aware of the
same consequences to the litigant and the public, deemed the allocation of the
43
loss to Parker and the preservation of sovereign immunity to be absurd.' In
their interpretation of the wildlife damage statute, the five justices collectively
rendered the meaning of the word ambiguous absurd, while simultaneously
rendering the meaning of the word absurd ambiguous. The court's internal
conflict over the application of these important concepts leaves the public with
little to do but wonder and pray.t
When Justices Golden and Macy engaged in their review of legislative
history, yet another dilemma inherent in statutory interpretation arose. In
finding that the legislature did not intend to remove sovereign immunity for
damage claims arising from harm inflicted to livestock by big game animals,
Justices Golden and Macy relied upon a crucial inference from the legislative
history. 45 Their inference is plausible; however, without the strong support
provided by their plain meaning analysis, their reliance upon the legislative
history would be tenuous. The 1980 session of the Wyoming Legislature
amended the wildlife damage statute to create state liability for damage to
livestock or other property caused by trophy game animals."' 6 The legislature
rejected an amendment which would have implied state liability for any wildlife-induced harm to livestock without regard to big game or trophy game
classifications. 47
139. See supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
140. Parker, 845 P.2d at 1050.
141.

See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.

142. See supra text accompanying note 92.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 84, 90-93.
144. Cf. Landis, supra note 52, at 886. Professor Landis passed on another connection between
jurisprudence and prayer when he wrote, "A passing acquaintance with the literature of statutory
interpretation evokes sympathy with the eminent judge who remarked that books on spiritualism and
statutory interpretation were two types of literary ebullitions that he had not learned to read." Justice
Urbigkit put an intriguing spin on the role of ambiguity in jurisprudence when he wrote in Allied
Signal. 813 P.2d at 223, "[I] do not agree with a closed-end and cramped adaptation just like I do not
agree that because jurists may differ in the interpretation of a contract, such disagreement necessarily
makes the contract ambiguous. We may be the ambiguity." (Emphasis added).
145. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
146. Id.

147. S. File 019, 45th Leg., 2d Sess. at 32-34 (1980). See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying
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In reviewing this legislative rejection, Justices Golden and Macy
inferred that the legislature did not want to expose the state to liability
from claims arising from big game damage to livestock.' 48 Three reasons
suggest the possibility of an opposite or nugatory inference: (1) the legislature may have thought the amendment redundant or superfluous and
therefore inappropriate for passage; (2) there are no public records explaining why the Wyoming Legislature acted as it did; and (3) the motives
of individual legislators are routinely complex, often involve such votetrading practices as log-rolling, and are universally not fully disclosed. 49
These factors suggest that legislative intentions are inscrutable and
may only be surmised. 5 ° The availability of a reasonable inference opposite the one drawn by Justices Golden and Macy warns against direct
reliance upon legislative history in interpreting statutes. Where the legislative history tends to bolster plain meaning analysis, as was true in Parker,
its use adds depth to the jurisprudence.'
Justices Thomas, Cardine, and Urbigkit did not assess the legislative
history of the wildlife damage law.' Their decisions not to use legislative
history, combined with their avoidance of the obvious conclusions of
plain meaning analysis, raise the prospect that the substantive outcome of
this controversy dominated their adjudication. While judicial motives are
in the abstract as inscrutable as legislative intentions, the possibility that
their jurisprudence amounted to a judicially-engineered interest group
transfer'53 cannot be discounted.
text. See generally William H. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67,
69 (1988) (includes analysis of "the 'rejected proposal rle,' which posits that proposals rejected by
Congress are an indication that the statute cannot be interpreted to resemble the rejected proposals").
148. Justices Golden and Macy determined that "[t]his legislative action unmistakably reveals a
clear intention to limit the claim coverage to livestock damaged or killed by a trophy game animal,
viz., black bear, grizzly bear, and mountain lion." Parker, 845 P.2d at 1065-66. A big game animal
is defined as an antelope, bighorn sheep, deer, elk, moose, or mountain goat. WYO. STAT. § 23-1101(a)(i) (1991).
149. The potentially pointless nature of the search for legislative intent was described by a
commentator who wrote, "There are a hundred ways a bill can die . . . [an abortive attempt to enact
a bill has no effect. Often proposals with wide support fail of enactment because the legislature lacks
the time to enact them or because agreed-on bills become pawns in larger struggles." Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 538-39 (1983). See also Peter C. Schanck,
An Essay on the Role of Legislative Histories in Statutory Interpretation, 80 LAW. LIBR. J. 391, 401
nn. 54-57 (1988).
150. Easterbrook, supra note 149, at 547.
151. Use of plain meaning analysis and legislative history may be characterized, albeit atypically, as result-oriented adjudication. In this context, the desired result appears to be literal adherence to
statutory language and judicial deference to the legislature. However, a fair analysis cannot rle out
motives rooted in a preference for the substantive outcome of limited state liability.
152. In one sentence, Justice Urbigkit dismissed the legislative history. Parker, 845 P.2d at
1080. Justice Cardine made no mention of it.
153. Although the Wyoming Constitution explicitly encourages passage of legislation to benefit
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity and its related canon of statutory interpretation were hit hard in Parker.5 4 Justices Thomas, Cardine,
and Urbigkit used their judicial power to increase the scope of the State's
liability. Even assuming, arguendo, that the wildlife damage law was
ambiguous, the doctrine of sovereign immunity suggests finding in favor
of the State.' The public interest principle which underlies the doctrine
of sovereign immunity-that public funds should only be made available
to private parties after legislative deliberation"' 6-appears to have been
unpersuasive to Justices Thomas, Cardine, and Urbigkit.
The narrow interpretation of the wildlife damage statute by Justices
Golden and Macy kept faith with the notion of judicial restraint where
two important factors were present: clear legislative policy was stated in
explicitly defined terms, and the putatively disadvantaged group, the
livestock industry, had a reasonable prospect of accessing and influencing
the legislative process.' 57 Both of these factors were present in Parker.
Public Policy Implications
In Parker, the State is a long term loser. 5 ' Its liability to damage
claims has grown. A consequence of this expanded state liability is that
future claimants for compensation may be lured into expensive and probably fruitless battles against circumstances beyond their control.' 5 9 While
the State might appear to have the upper hand in fending off future claims
for brucellosis-related compensation, it is no victory for the State or its
citizens to spend the considerable amount of time and energy required to
defend a suit."6 Given the ultimately unpredictable nature of litigation,

the livestock industry, that constitutional provision is explicitly and exclusively addressed to the legislature. See supra note 30. See also Sunstein, supra note 49, at 471 (encouraging courts to "narrowly
construe statutes that embody mere interest group deals"). For a superb analysis of the current state
of the separation of powers doctrine, see Burt Neuborne, In Praise of Seventh-Grade Civics: A Plea
for Stricter Adherence to Separation of Powers, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 385 (1991).
154. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
158. In the short term, the State avoided an adverse judgment of potentially more than one
million dollars, as well as the negative precedential value such an award might have had. Interview
with Dr. E. Tom Thorne, Director of Veterinary Research, Wyoming Game and Fish Department, in
Laramie, Wyo. (Sept. 9, 1993).
159. Future owners of diseased livestock will inevitably face burden of proof problems similar
to those of Parker. These problems may include imperfect vaccination rates, multiple potential sources of transmission, absence of direct evidence of wildlife-borne transmission, and uncertain infection
rates among mobile and elusive big game animals.
160. The Parkerprecedent ensures that the State's liability is not certain. If it were, one might
anticipate the smooth functioning of the administrative remedy provided in the wildlife damage statute
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losses by the State and consequent payment of large sums in adverse
judgments represents an undesirable form of contingent liability.
It is in the better long term interest of Wyoming ranchers and the
Wyoming citizenry that ranchers not be invited to waste time and money
in a conflict with the State. Here, the Parker case is an object-lesson.
Parker failed to recover anything from the State. Compounding its misery, Parker also found itself adrift, with no livestock and absent the money spent in litigation, in a vast sea of cultural and economic changes.' 6'
The livestock industry, as an interest group, remains a potent political force in Wyoming.162 Nonetheless, its days of overwhelming political
dominance 16 appear to have passed." This is particularly true with regard to federal land management policies, especially in the area of the
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.'6
and prediction of future litigation would seem unfounded. However, in the event of a future outbreak
of brucellosis in a Wyoming cattle herd, the confused outcome of Parker offers fertile ground for
aggressive attorneys and substantially harmed clients. In light of this, the State may be expected to
defend itself against future claims, all at more expense to Wyoming citizens.
161. In addition to the ever-present variables of changing consumer dietary choices, regional
competition, shifting interest rates, and foul weather, at least four forces are making livestock ranching in the region around the Parker Ranch an increasingly precarious venture: (1) Federal grazing fees
are likely to rise in the near future. A. P., [Interior Secretary] Babbitt Threatens HigherGrazing Fees
if Deal Fails. Opponents May Hit Back with Filibuster, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Oct. 16, 1993, at BI.
(2)Federal Endangered Species Act Protection and related regulations, in the summer of 1993, forced
ranchers whose cattle graze immediately west of the Parker's Warm Springs Allotment to suffer the
loss and related damage recovery hassles of more than twenty-five cattle to grizzly bears. The official
government response was, "We will not go into [critical grizzly bear habitat] and trap and remove
bears that are depredating livestock on public lands." Chris Servheen, Interagency Grizzly Bear Study
Team Member, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, quoted in Angus M. Thuermer, Jr., Togwotee Griz
Gets a Reprieve, JACKSON HOLE NEWS, Oct. 13, 1993, at IA. (3) Loss of neighboring ranches to

residential subdivision is reducing the supply of qualified labor, and cowboy wages are generally too
low to attract new entrants. See also supra note 61. (4) The rise in recreational use of federal lands
periodically puts users such as mountain bike riders and backpackers in conflict with cattle, expressed
through displacement of cattle from desired ranges and political antipathy against public land livestock
grazing. See also supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
162. If political power were purely a reflection of economic importance, the livestock industry
would be a bit player in Wyoming. Agricultural services (including ranching, forestry, and fisheries)
accounted for just 4.16% of the total gross Wyoming State product in 1988. BUCK MCVEIGH, SENIOR
ECONOMIST, & JOHN SARLES, ECONOMIST, DEPARTMENT OF ADMIN. & INFORMATION, WYOMING
GROSS STATE PRODUCT REPORT 12 (1991). However, in the 1993-94 Wyoming State Legislature,
40% of the Senators and 30% of the Representatives came from an agricultural background. WYOMING TRUCKING ASs'N, INC., LAWMAKERS OF WYOMING, FIFTY-SECOND WYOMING STATE LEGISLATURE 1993-94, (1993), and interview with Matilda Hansen, State Representative HD 13, in Laramie,
Wyo. (Oct. 25, 1993). See also Candy Moulton, Watt. Westerners are 'learning to fear our
government', CASPER STAR-TRIB., Nov. 15, 1993, at Al (attributing to former U.S. Dep't of Interior

Secretary James Watt the remark, "Wyoming's wealth comes from the state's minerals, but 'our
values come from agriculture'").
163.

See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.

164. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
165. See Robert B. Keiter and Mark S. Boyce, Greater Yellowstone's Future: Ecosystem Man-
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In light of the livestock industry's long term political vulnerability,
the Game and Fish Department's desire to work cooperatively with ranchers, and the broad public interest in maintaining both ranching and free
ranging wildlife, a damage claim structure which pits livestock interests
directly against wildlife interests promises pain for all.' 66 Further, such a
structure raises the specter not of cooperative efforts to eradicate or minimize the spread of brucellosis, but of the elimination of cattle from federal land grazing allotments. 6 7 Lost access to these grazing allotments
would render deeded land less valuable for ranching, and would hasten its
conversion to residential or other non-agricultural use. Thus the judicial

expansion of the State's liability in Parker appears to be a Pyrrhic victory
for the livestock industry.
In the presence of powerful socio-economic factors which appear to
be adverse to long term livestock interests in Wyoming, and considering
the negative effects of State liability to suit, 6 8 a legislative endorsement of

agement in a Wilderness Environment, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING
AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 379-409 (R. Keiter & M. Boyce eds., 1991). See also supra note
57. Cf. John M. Good, Don't move bears, JACKSON HOLE NEWS, Oct. 20, 1993, at 4A (Good wrote:
[R]anching is an integral part of Jackson Hole, and [rancher Paul] Walton is certainly one

of the best land stewards in the state. This said, I cannot agree with his opinion that [grizzly] bears should be trapped in [critical] habitat and moved out. As for his observation that
other ranchers might be less tolerant than he, I hope they would realize that head-on confrontation with the Endangered Species Act would not be in their best interests").
166. According to Dr. Thome, ranchers could potentially claim that numerous harmful diseases
might have been transmitted to cattle by wildlife. State liability for damages arising from diseaserelated claims could cost millions of dollars and threaten the financial integrity of the Game and Fish
Department. In addition, such liability would create an incentive to keep cattle off of public lands and
wildlife off of private lands. Big game animals in Wyoming need to use private lands, which are often
crucial for their survival during harsh winters months. The Game and Fish Department strongly
prefers a peaceful and cooperative co-existence with livestock interests. Interview with Dr. E. Tom
Thorne, Director of Veterinary Research, Wyoming Game and Fish Department, in Laramie, Wyo.,
(Sept. 9, 1993). See also Tom Morton, Spokesman: G & F Seeks Reform of Wildlife Damage Compensation, CASPER STAR-TRIB., June 8, 1993, at Cl (stating the Game and Fish Department wants to
shift the burden of proving harm to landowners, refine the appeals process for claims, and more fairly

distribute compensation funds). Loss prevention and an alternate damage compensation program
should be used in lieu of additional legal wrangling between livestock and wildlife interests, (e.g.
Calf-hood vaccination rates at or above the Dobois area standard of 51.8% may hold promise. See
supra note 18. In addition, WYO. STAT. § 11-19-106 (1993) provides for state compensation of owners of diseased livestock, as long as the livestock owner complies with proper slaughter procedures
and orders, and as long as the livestock were not improperly imported into Wyoming or reasonably
known to have been infected with disease prior to their arrival in Wyoming).
167.

A.P., Jackson Hole Ranchers Side with U.S. in Brucellosis Case, CASPER STAR-TRIB.,

Jan. 20, 1992 at BI, (quoting former Wyoming Governor and U.S. Senator Cliff Hansen as saying:
the concern we have is that if, indeed, the federal government were to lose this suit [Parker 11],it would certainly give the federal government ample opportunity, a real reason, to
come in and say, 'why should we continue to permit grazing if ranchers are going to turn
around and sue us for situations such as Mr. Parker is faced with over there?'").
168. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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the analysis and conclusions of Justices Golden and Macy is appropriate.
Legislative action affirming the State's immunity from damage claims
arising from harm to livestock by big game animals would achieve an
appropriate balance between the State's interest in fiscal solvency and the
livestock industry's need for political and economic viability.' 69
Such legislative action would also prevent the State from acting as
an unwitting accomplice in the undesirable demise of ranching in northwest Wyoming. 7 0 Finally, a legislative correction of the finding of
cognizability in Parker would restore the proper balance of power between the legislative and judicial branches of government.
CONCLUSION

Given the presence of explicit techncal terms, informative legislative
history, and a legislature whose job it is to write statutes and balance

complex interests, the substitution of judicial policy in Parker for the
plain meaning of the statutory text upsets the basic balance between the
judicial and legislative branches of government. 7 '
In several important ways, the approach used by Justices Golden and
Macy differs from and is superior to the method applied by Justices
Thomas, Cardine and Urbigkit. Justices Golden and Macy gave binding
force to the written words of the statute.' 72 In so doing they fulfilled the
constitutionally significant goal of judicial deference to the legislative
branch. They also recognized the benefits of and the court's proper role

169. Cf. WYO. STAT. § 1-39-120 (1991) (carefully tailored waiver of sovereign immunity for
certain kinds of State negligence in the maintenance of the State highway system keeps damage claims
to an affordable level, and imposes the cost of loss compensation, i.e. private insurance, on all the
beneficiaries of State roads). See also supra notes 166-67.
170. C. Luther Propst, III, of the Sonoran Institute of Tucson, Arizona, conducted a public goal
setting exercise in Dubois, Wyoming, on November 20 and 21, 1992. It attracted more than 120
citizens, including 19 ranchers, 28 business-people, 10 education-related workers, 16 retirees, 27 selfemployed people, and 8 government workers. They gave both ranching and wildlife conservation
their strong support, and forged a vision statement which reads, "Dubois will be a community which
celebrates its western heritage, natural resources, open spaces and strong community character, and
enhances these values through responsible planning." CITY OF DUBOIS, WHAT COURSE FOR DUBOIS?
A REPORT ON THE SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITIES WORKSHOP (1992) (available at the Dubois, Wyo-

ming, Town Hall).
171. "If judges ... will play fast and loose with 'plain meanings' on which substantial judicial
authorities can not themselves agree, if they will impute imaginary intentions to fictitious entities, if
they will arbitrarily select purposes and equally arbitrarily forecast consequences, they can not hope
to convince laymen that they are acting rationally or usefully." Radin, supra note 52, at 885.
172. The value of this approach was neatly put by Frank H. Easterbrook, who wrote, "if
statutes' words do not convey meaning and bind judges, why should judges' words bind or even
interest the rest of us?" Easterbrook, supra note 149, at 534, n. 2.
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in adjudicating the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In addition, the opinion of Justices Golden and Macy would have rendered a clear decision,
both for the parties to the dispute and for the broader community of
interested people who must live with, and may in the future be affected
by, the precedent of Parker. Unfortunately, in Parker these benefits are
lost to the citizens of Wyoming, as only two of five justices saw fit to
promote them.
Parker also creates bad public policy. The inescapable practical
problem of linking any future brucellosis outbreak in livestock with the
endemic presence of brucellosis in nearby elk or bison counsels strongly
against the finding of cognizability achieved in Parker. Both the need for
cooperation among wildlife and livestock interests, and the increased
potential for high-stakes conflict which now exists, call for legislative
action.
Native wildlife and their relatively recently arrived bovine companions will continue to coexist in Wyoming for the foreseeable future,
although the terms of their coexistence appear to be changing. Similarly,
the wildlife damage laws and their related adjudications which govern a
part of the relationship between wildlife and livestock will also continue
to evolve. As they do, one can only hope that the methods of statutory
interpretation and the relationship between the judicial and legislative
branches of government may one day be as finely tuned as were the
balances of nature on that fateful day in 1830, when Captain William
Sublette
moved the first five cattle into the land destined to become Wyo73
ming.
LEONARD R. CARLMAN

173.

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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